Craft as a Problem:

A Detachment from Authentic Reality

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2019

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Abstract

This essay sets to explore the problems embedded by craft in the current social context, one that is specifically modern. The view of craft objects breeds a sentiment that places it outside the systems that generate the everyday, in an area of nostalgia and irrelevance as an answer to issues with modernity. This veneer blocks the true, valuable experience that lies in an individual's potential to craft, further than lone objects, but alternative systems that erase and challenge. Overlooked too is the potential of the individual to craft themselves and adapt to complications that challenge the notion of "I".

Firstly, the conceptual aspects of craft will be probed: sentiment, longing, object, systems, scale, and shown to be far more complete and complex than simply a collection of hand-craft objects. There will be a disparity between the dormant potential that lies in craft practice to answer problems when compared with the current context; therefore what I understand to provide answers to the problematic context will be provided, both metaphysical and material, hopefully providing the reader with a greater knowledge of the power in practising their autonomy.

Craft as a Problem: A Detachment from Authentic Reality

There seems to be a problem in human experience of a disassociation with reality. A dissatisfaction for what is experienced as structure, system and place forms a context in which longing for the other grows so great it obscures current experience. Is it possible that there is a means of crafting, with care inherent, a reality where interest is cultivated and association regained? I plan to identify the conditions that in their presence and absence can affect understanding of the context for understanding. Society is identified as a circumstance embodying amalgamated thought, which allows for the individual to act as force for change, either good or bad depending on the strength of the grasp of narrative. When what we do is expanded as a problem, what we are can be questioned, drawing a distinction between the experience of the current context and a more fulfilling alternative.

Drawing on existential and phenomenological philosophies, the introspective development of the self becomes an enlightening source as to how best find this more fulfilling alternative. Where the fulfilled self meets reality is a question of authenticity; where finding authenticity as an ideal is a problem of the mode of relation between what is real and not real in modernity.

Problems with Authenticity in Place, Fiction and Narrative

Place is stated regarding the physical world and not location. Place in this way exists as the base context for the projection of collective human understanding. A continuous development in culture and consumption is founded on this understanding, however the continual re-commodification of

use can only be dictated. Deliberate or passive ignorance to ideals surrounding personhood founds a societal nihilism, where human practice represents a past world consumed by modernity. This notion of the self-destructing community is explored by Karl Marx (Hinman, 1977), with the cause identified as the deliberate ignorance of the bourgeois to the effect of their economic creativity; the *'moral, social and psychic abyss'.* (Marshall, 1982) Marshall expands on this further as a symptom of the individual [110], one based on either individuality or a collective self than shuns the fusion of political economy and individual union Marx proposes as a path to freedom from the master. This individual seems to be typecast; prescribed a role that requires the desire to act of their own volition in a system formed of a determined desire, and in this is the flaw in the interpretation of the individual. The individual is fact, and to prescribe it to a system in an exercise in uncertainty. The prescription may be this or that, or that and this, so where does the justifying factor lie? If it is absolute, it contradicts the notion of freedom at the centre of liberation, and if it is sentiment, then it must be recognised that sentiments vary between culture and society. Evaluations of the ever-changing now are not analyses of modernity, but interpretations of the environment, and Marx's interpretation for a society without the need for a centralised economy, state or government runs contrary to an existence currently experienced. Before Marx, G.W.F Hegel re-considered ideas of *praxis (activity)* over *poiesis (labour),* in favour of a system based on *'a civil society'*, one that encapsulated a trading economy (Blanchette, 1979). Motivated by a desire to contain what was an unregulated entity, the ideal of rationalises the world as it exists, not a world as it should [10] (Stedman-Jones, undated). Criticism is also received from Nietzsche for providing a system contributing to herd mentality without providing any answer to individual serfdom (Hinman). Marx is providing an ideal in which increased benefit eradicates the problem of subordinate identity which leaves the source of

sentiment ignored. In this regard, the individual is better represented in terms of physical action instead of ideal, and is therefore more real. Evaluations of the sentiment felt in modernity account for variation to a much greater extent. The notion of rewriting the systems that operate in society for the sake of a morality, that are empirically non-existent, seems to be an exercise in dreaming a Utopia.

Alternately, drawing attention to a Goethe's *Faust* as a work able to enlighten problems with Utopia (Berman) [74]. Goethe was influenced by Le Globe, a publication founded on the ideas of Saint-Simonianism, a utopia founded on the long-term interests of the population serving as the motive to act for those referred to as bourgeois in Marx's utopia. Faust as character is shown to cultivate a greater understanding of what it is to be human, i.e. purer compassion, whilst growing ever further from *'the totality of life'* as he develops his identity. Through meditation, Faust comes to meet the Earth Spirit which leaves him with the proposition of finding a spirit closer to man instead of striving for the notion of *'Ubermensch'*. This proposition calls for a desire to enhance one's character as mensch (man), with striving performed through more rational means [42]. Therefore when individual escapes any notion of becoming embedded in Utopia, it is at its most real. It is possible for the individual to exist as real in Utopia, but it is less real and further from the ideal. In relation to this postulate, instead of the absolutism found in Marx in defining characteristics of individuals in society, the system Goethe eludes to aims to provide a structure to be individual in. Claude Henri de Rouvroy, founder of the ideal, defined the role of the modern intellectual as the organiser. [73-74]

The idea of the individual as an organiser, a free mind with direction raises questions towards freedom as an ideal, that I believe leads to an answer for

the detachment of authentic experience from a use of the physical in modernity. Ideas of pure freedom are explored through the character Antoine Roquentin in *Nausea* (Sartre, 1938). Roquentin lives alone, eats, drinks, writes, and fornicates alone, but exists through a continuous desire to be explore a repulsion caused by interaction with his fundamental existence. Thoughts exist, as do objects, and the character follows a Cartesian path (cogito ergo sum) in trying to quantify his existence in between the two, always seeking to escape object or subject. Sartre writes, *'Objects should not touch because they are not alive. You use them, put them back in place, you live among them: they are useful, nothing more. But they touch me, it is unbearable. I am afraid of being in contact with them.'* [N, 10] The unbreakable attachment found in the connection to the physical world is that which prevents pure freedom, although as ideal it still exists. The exploration of freedom is rooted in a desire to understand being as an individual experience; an understanding of the interpretation between *'consciousness and things'* (Kleinberg, 2005). Kleinberg interprets Nausea as an attempt to follow the investigation into creative ontologies in *Being and Time* (Heidegger, 1953). *The Transcendence of the Ego* (Sartre, 1934), in which the ego is defined as an exterior aspect of an experience of the world, and that consciousness exists through objects as total, individual material. The projection of qualities and intricacies onto an object is mute in everything other than a development in understanding the ego, which is understood to be the centre of subjectivity. The ego is explained as the sum of parts: *'The I is the Ego as the unity of its actions. The me is the Ego as the unity of states and qualities.'* [T.E., 12] To make things concrete, be it the self, one's life, or what one is, to ignore the continual experience of material.

To understand being as an individual within the current context is to understand authentic autonomy, but to understand authentic narrative

distinguished from fiction, is to come closer to an understanding of an authenticity as an ideal. An experience of object through an ego-self projects distinction in value, which may also be distinction between materials, scale, and price. When this is tied to a hyper-inflated consumer culture, every object becomes poisoned by the values driven by the culture. If this culture values how cost effective a material may be, then it slowly seeps into every object, consuming them whole. When this self-consuming culture, not society as Marx referenced, poisons objects evermore, then the objects that inform consciousness are informing it of aspects like cost-effectiveness, not joy or pleasure. People aren't inherently cost effective. If we are akin to the organiser, which gives an account of pleasure through exercising autonomy, then time spent organising (being) is a freedom. There is a use to organisation too, one that is missing in attitudes towards maximum economy, as there is no room for organising for what are the autonomous individual desires; desires to find authentic reality. This drives a desire for escape to something freer. The idea of interactions with objects forming consciousness would explains the desire to re-define objects as totems for missing sentiment or feeling. Tactility, colour, texture, natural form are all missing in the malaise of modernity culture reacts to now.

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The idea of nostalgic indulgence is one that exists within modernity and cannot exist without it. It is separate to place and identity, for nostalgia is detached from authenticity as it is formed as a fictive narrative. Formed in the real is a visible, physical manifestation of an individual understanding, but also a concept that forms the interaction persons have with the real. The nostalgic totem embodies a mode of experience, that of longing for something of substance and meaning, one distancing the required understanding of the conditions in their pure form.

Nostalgia is built on traditions and sentiment for the past, but these constructions as Sartre writes, are *'a state of vacation and inaction'.*^(T.E., 131) Traditions themselves are regenerated, from reality to fable, and embraced through as an alternate reality. The connotations surrounding the Barbour Jacket are clear (an archetypal mental image of dog walking in all weathers) which exist outside of the function of the jacket. There is no lure in having large pockets, but there is interest to be captured in constructing identity. The use of the kilt for these means is explored in The Invention of Tradition: The Highland Tradition of Scotland (Trevor-Roper,1983) finding it to be of place in the false Highland traditions offered from one Scottish culture to another. A series of frauds and forgeries were created by two MacPhersons, Rev. John and James, to distinguish their culture from its Irish ancestry, and the previous view of Highland barbarism and morphed into a sentimentalised fable of ancient peoples. Derived from the Irish *leine* (much like a tabard), the kilt descended from a tartan *philibeg* (supposedly of 4th century origin), which seems improbable as the mills suitable for creating tartan, and the idea of the clan identity formed by Sir Walter Scott, came to fruition in the late 18th Century. This identity is born from interpretative means not use, for the tabard is equally as functional and is used as a curated interpretation harnessed to rouse sentiment. Sentiment as a theme in a human understanding to the world, through the perception of objects and structures is investigated by On Longing (Stewart, 1993). Souvenirs exist as embodiments of ourselves and our sentiment, and their conception begins with our own objectification.

"Authentic' experience becomes both elusive and allusive as it is placed beyond the horizon of the present lived experience, the beyond in which the antique, the pastoral, the exotic and the other fictive domains are articulated... The experience of the object lies outside the body's experience – it is saturated with meaning that will never be fully revealed to us. '^(O.L., 133)

In this is what has been referenced as Invented Tradition (Hobsbawm, 1983). Invented traditions raise problems on authenticity. The tradition exists as an escape from modernity and vice versa. There is a fluidity between both poles of ancient and modern with authenticity becoming a mediating factor. I'll come to whether authenticity can exist alone, but it is used to process what feels right and what feels wrong. Notions of a ruse, one in which society adopts a fabrication, are intimate with identity. If there is a shade of in-authenticity in the fabrication or narrative, then this inauthenticity is reflected in identity. It seems that feelings of kinship in sharing an inauthenticity are more alluring than the individual following a path to greater authenticity and in this case, the responsibility to create authentically is more essential than successful narrative. It is also important to note that the relevance of authenticity need not be absolute, that any development in a direction seeking is more valuable than cultivated ignorance. The objectification of objectification, where an exterior glaze applied has become its own school of thinking and art founded on informal formalism (Bourdieu, 1990), and is shown to be complicit in creating the foundation for future understanding.

> *'...cherished by all formalisms... is the scholastic institution and all that it implies such as the speakers' and the receivers' disposition to accept and indeed believe in what is said.'* (L.o.P, 32)

If modernity exists as a base context for reality to exist on, then modernity is the context in which the individual feels the recoil of misunderstanding. As misunderstanding embeds itself in thought and the construction of the physical, we feel closer to a false, inauthentic form of reality. A lack of feeling bred from this, forms a self-generating problem causing a longing for things inauthentic. The effect of narrative on the real in a context is a distinction between objects: *this, not that* instead of simply *this. This* is pure and

individual, therefore to find what is authentically real requires a disassociation with inauthenticity through a detachment from narrative.

If there is a problem, not just a circumstance, it exists as the mode of relation between what is not real and inauthentic in modernity; whether the authentic real does truly exist in modernity.

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An Authentic Self

Ultimately, all external stimulus can be categorised by the means of analysing its authenticity. As part of a delineating process, the construction of a processing form must exist, so the stimulus must be filtered through what is understood as the self. Revolving around the relation of the self to reality is a flux of constant uncertain change, therefore appropriate changes must lie within a capacity to change. Adaptations in the self, for better or for good, perhaps for logic or understanding, are all explored within the remit of thought covered by phenomenological philosophies, notably of Edmund Husserl and Martin Heidegger. The idea of being is a concurrent theme in the investigation into the human as a singular, plural, and as a medium for realisation.

Heidegger's understanding of being is referred to a *Dasein* or There-Being that implies a tie to time and place. In this there is an immediate negation of the issues with being existing as an exterior component to the human experience, one that Heidegger aimed to scrutinise in attempting to find the root of the split he saw to exist between classical metaphysics of the Eastern and Western Worlds. (Wheeler, 2011) The empirical approach to classify being outside of experience, a concrete definition, lacks a transience that is innate to being. He argues that the need to create and devise systems of

thought is there to accommodate ontologies for infinite subject and cross subject matters, enabling such a complex history of branches and sub sections that the intent becomes a total analysis of being inside the now foundational fictional ontology.

'all ontology, no matter how rich and firmly compacted a system of categories it has at its disposal, remains blind and perverted from its ownmost aim, if it has not first adequately clarified the meaning of Being, and conceived this clarification as its fundamental task.' [B.T, 31]

There is potential to translate this to the cultural structures in place when combined with the previous reference to Bourdieu. The dialectic split between its function as a transient series of functional adaptations and its existence as the physical manifestation of a designated ontology, enables a speculative, critical reflection of the motives in the appropriation of something inherently human, in as much as it enables being. In Heidegger's thought, there is a desire to remove the personalised idea of being, born of existence inside ontologies, to create analytic thought independent of structure. This instability is in contradiction with the innate desire to understand and know all, and is something that can be rediscovered in a contra-distinction of one's idea of one's self.

This idea of individual self is a variation on Husserl's identification of the self as a nondescript ego centre identity. Husserl raises a question of how phenomena as instances can enlighten the justification and rationality of experience and belief. A distinction is made between *general meaning function* and relative *meaning*, dividing intent from momentary reality. This as *indexable experience* is represents meaning embedded in the understanding of a moment, and that one who is subject to a moment experiences reality if

understood only through such experience (Beyer, 2003). The moment is also able to provide a predictability to future experience or *intentional horizon*. Ensuring the relative certainty of the future is *a sense of identity in time*. Two subjects may experience the similar stimulus for a similar *horizon* or similar moment, and the unity between similar experience lies in perceptual content, or *noema*. Reference of the noema as *act matter* can be found in early works of Husserl, it forms a rigid context for the variations in interpretation. The difference between the philosophies resides in identity. Husserl identifies the self as a general ego in a thinking being, whereas the self in Heidegger is a specifically individual being (Husserl,1927-31). This divergence allows for a greater emphasis to be placed on uncertainty, which surfaces as a contradiction to Husserl's application of the weight with which the *noema* (act matter) act to form reality.

The self as a medium for realisation gives an objective nature to all that one is by contextualising it as a processor. Heidegger gives two aspects of encounters with objects in which we process them as experience, not simply individual objects with their own individual character. He explains the hammer as a tool justifies its own being in its use, not simply as being, and explains that through use we come to understand it's being. This is referred to as its *readiness-to-hand* (Heidegger, 1927). *Dasein* comes to realise the reason for objects through their use, by realising the complete functionality of the object through perfect fluid use. In this state, there is no need for further classification nor application of devised ontology, these things just are. Heidegger points to a transformation when following Western thought patterns of *readiness-at-hand* to *presence-at-hand*, where the objects gain an independence. This creates a distinction between the *Dasein* and the world, forming an active, fluid problem-solving entity, especially in cases where the readiness-to-hand develops obstructions and flaws.

The individual in these terms is authentic, therefore phenomenological interpretation is without true definition as it identifies that the real is formed by constant processing of experience. The retrieval of the *real* should then lie in the individual locating the authentic self. If performed in such a way that the actions of the individual are projected subconsciously (naturally), the physical and mental process finds authentic reality.

To allow for metaphysical practice alone to provide an answer, an account of the effect of approaching the problem of identifying *real* from a perspective of thought or thinking in the cultures that Zen practice reside should be given. An investigation into this distinction is given in *An Inquiry into the Good* (Nishida,1990) Firstly, he states that good arises from the conditions created through either innate understanding or learned activity, that leads to a state of motivation. To put this motivation into practice requires an incentive to act, or a desired outcome to move towards and is formed from an interpretation of one's surroundings. This motivation breeds a desire to act and a will to create a working outcome. Nishida understands these personal, physical motivations to be part of a *phenomena of consciousness*, which despite an attempted avoidance to clarify seems to be purely innate; an unavoidable ontology. This will is rooted firmly in individual interpretation, forming an undefined unity between one and the environment, therefore forming a bond between thought and its source and the abstract metaphysical good. This *good* is embedded in thinking, will, imagination, morality, and therefore is a subjective; at least a progressive interpretive objective. Placing good in a future ideal, a primary feature of experience before morality, leaves morality as a product of good but not as good alone, for a deficiency of good i.e. bad, could fulfil all the same criteria for just action and produce bad morality. In this there is no explanation as to why there is a tendency for good, and prior to an explanation, Nishida locates the core of motivation, again lying in the unexplainable.

'Because theories of heteronomous ethics cannot explain why we must perform the good, the good loses all meaning. This leads us to seek the basis of morality in human nature and then to consider in terms of human nature such problems as the good and the reason we must perform the good.'
(I.G,111)

If base existence lies in an unquantifiable entity, then attempts to quantify it will prove inevitably fruitless. What this leaves behind is an empirical equivalence to *nothing*. Nothing is falsifiable or verifiable. There are no proofs. Nothingness as a formational ontology creates Heidegger's standpoint, but he is keen to retain the attachment to thinking itself (*Denken des Seins)* (Abe, 1985) [119]. This is the element that maintains the divide between the classical Western thought Heidegger sought to break and the classical Eastern thought he sought to draw from. The attachment to the self is problematic for Heidegger's phenomenological thought as it forces narrative into a process trying to identify the *real*. Critique found in *Le Probleme de la Genese dans la Philosophie de Husserl* (Derrida, 1954) intended for the works of Husserl are also relevant to Heidegger. Both philosophers understand the self as *transcendental ego* (Lawlor, 2002), using Husserlian *epoché* to isolate ideals from reality. Derrida adopts a critique that for this mode of practice to be fulfilled, the life of an individual is fulfilled in the context of the *cultural milieu*, [49] and the conditions are to be protected if they are to retain any meaning (T-D-Thao, 1951). The conditions are *the material world* with material that *'envelops all the significations of life, as life in this world. The moment of materiality constitutes the infrastructure of human life'* [P.G.P.H, 325]. Derrida furthers this by attempting to verify Husserl's notion of a purely transcendental being; that in creating conditions in which the ego can become increasingly essential, the ideals continue to maintain a relation to problems regarding reality.

Derrida exposes a fluctuation in the variance between conscious acts as concrete and Husserl's procedure in The Philosophy of Arithmetic (Husserl, 1891) to identify mathematical process as reliant on conscious reality. If conscious reality is unfurling moment after moment, interpreted without a priori certainty, then how can mathematics exist as absolute form? An approach to mathematics as an exterior ideal seems a strange path to take, given its formation as a school of thought is formed as a series of developing interpretations of reality, but one can understand Derrida's frustration with Husserl in pursuing an absolute ideal then providing a foundation in which mathematic value exists in abstraction from an a priori thing in general.[68]

In this is a wider topic in which absolutism is questioned for an absolute proof the reality it generates is also absolute but I will approach this shortly. Dasein is closer to reality than Husserl's relation of ego and noema, for it is not purely transcendent, but its engagement with context is akin to nostalgia in the way it seeks to unite the problematic present with a separate ideal. A phenomenologically thinking being cannot escape real flaws. However, if what is most real is most authentic, then Derrida's critique is not a hindrance, for the reality is nostalgia is taken as is, an indisputable past. If indisputable and therefore real, the authenticity of Dasein remains. At this point an argument that is inherently imperfect holds an attribute found in authentic reality; that of imperfection. Regarding an absolute self this becomes cyclical, but it maintains integrity when leading to a comparison with Zen teaching.

I understand that the removal of thought on the topic of thinking to justify new modes of being seems inherently contradictory, but the investigation of Zen practice is useful in enlightening the effect of process on the self and although the nature of writing is to justify a stance, both forms of practice are equally as adept in the construction of a functional, personal ontology.

Thought is central to Zen practice and exists as the cornerstone of being, yet in this structure is tied to complexities that generate fluid action, one's outside of thought. This is no return to a prior genus without the same ability to grasp a philosophy, it is a clarification that leads to only philosophic ideal. *No thinking* is beyond both thought and no thought with foundations in developing wisdom and compassion, both interpretive aspects related to time and process.

Zen is built on negations, and negations of negations, creating a structure that is neither nothing nor everything. (Abe, 1985) When one seeks to understand exterior stimulus, they are the determinant affecting the conditions of conditions i.e. the water is water and the glass is glass. However, the motivation in setting the condition is neither mutual nor absolute, thereby introducing an arbitrary absolutism. If one has no place as a determinant then the glass and water are neither glass nor water. This acceptance is exceptionally important with regards to object forming context but I'd like to revisit this later

The negation of the self and its capacity to execute action from motivation allows for experience to be interpreted as *just being;* not *just* tied to moral justification, but *just* regarding direct experience. The glass is *just* glass and the water *just* water.

This form of direct experience is a transition from the *ego-self* to the *self.* The metaphysical *'I'* is the determinant, the ego-self, and in visceral materiality is where the self lies. To realise the true self one must navigate experience with a scrutiny of character that follows no guidance. This navigation although an aspect of the ego-self and its search for knowing, leads to an infinite regression into questions and contradictions that end in an understanding that that which cannot be found in experience is tied to the ever increasingly obsolete ego-self. Quoting Rinzai, Abe links the idea of complex negations and the self with process.

"If you seek him, he retreats farther and farther away; if you don't seek him, then he's right in front of your eyes"

The likeness of Heidegger's clarification of the idea of readiness-to-hand and its flux between presence-to-hand is quite alike, drawing upon the same unity between the forms of the self and their experience and actions. The difference is that Dasein is exterior to the problem that its purpose is to solve, with this relation changing the dynamic of feeling. The direct experience of Zen is a direct involvement in the problem, and all motivation and will is justified good as the problem is endless and all encompassing. All actions are fluid and the individual in these terms, is authentic.

I lean on idea of feeling as a spiritual non-entity and the tendency is to create a critique founded upon anti-intellectualism, however an empirical process demands an answer which must negate, with certainty, all other outcomes. These two examples both give certainty if based on false contingency, but to justify with total certainty that the reality they exist in is real is to wager on what is most prominent, not what is possible. For this reason, I must clarify that all distinctions, regardless of relative relations to one another, are valid as truth lies outside of structures of modernity and culture. The relative, justifiable truth that lies in their likeness, emerges when they're shown to overlap.

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The unification of nostalgia and modernity as the source of problems regarding authenticity exist mainly as a series of variable ideals that fail to penetrate everyday process. How one can begin to explore this without it appearing an indulgence requires an expanded process enquiring into the relation of the ideals and what forms the *real*. *Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance* (Pirsig, 1974) recognises this problem through a unique personal scenario that manages to separate the authentic, real self from the inauthentic self. A previous experience of dissociative, then catatonic schizophrenia creates a void between two points of the past, therefore creating a modern context that exists with little regard for what came before. The process isolates two mutually existing ideals and creates conditions where a resolution is found in finding the bond. Recorded are circumstances that are examples of how to act and understand the physical world. Pirsig resists the idea of clarifying any absolute view which can be understood through Zen metaphysics, but applies Zen philosophy in the context of *inauthentic* modernity. He acts, at the core, as an ever-present pair of eyes filtering minute detail.

The exploration of a question exorcised outside of the boundaries of reality can clearly be seen from the problematic relationships Pirsig has with numerous aspects of the everyday: family bonds, communication, value systems, and continuity, but his negative sentiment to these conditions is with their *inauthenticity* and not what they commonly represent. Accounts given in which Pirsig is at his most *real*, for instance internal dialogues regarding his sentiment towards his mental illness, are those when he is recalling history with clarity. When he is imparting his authentic self onto reality, the conditions are alike, although without overlap. The use of proverbs is regular

in his dialect and a deliberate appropriation of the value they hold in Zen teaching (Abe). The inherent truth in a proverb is its ability to reflect a *synthetic* means of portraying a contextual truth. There are no exterior proofs or attachments, but the truth *is* in any circumstance in which the proverb is relevant. The most relatable and transferable aspect of Pirsig's thinking to reality is the constant reference to an intimate understanding of his motorcycle.

A microcosm of the world in engineered form, a relation to logic and reason (the *analytic)* is explained through the relationships of absolute parts and essentially *free* value systems and process. The process that the individual works to are built to an ideal formed from an understanding of past reality and value (and by these means are free), but the value of an ideal is nothing without the rigid format of volatile, low tolerance components. Both aspects are dependent on one another, therefore an *analytic* context fails for *'logic presumes a separation of subject from object; therefore logic is not final wisdom'* [(132)]. Pure *synthetic* ideal is avoided too, for the components must be acknowledged as *analytically* real in their *analytic* reality. *Synthetic* ideal is shown to be an *inauthentic* reality through the failings of any explanation of how components interface correctly. The components cannot and will not fix themselves, nor prevent the effects of degradation, nor do anything else other than what they are doing at any moment in time, be it working, breaking, or broken. The mediating factor in the process of motorcycle problem solving must be a being capable of reasoning and acting in an *analytic* reality using *synthetic* understanding. or an *authentic* self acting in *authentic* reality.

For the continuous state of *authentic* self, all focus must be given to reality to make it *authentic* too. There is an enlightening passage given by Pirsig after an account of a terrible trip to a mechanic for the first and last time, one centred on the value of meditative practice as answer and antidote to problems. The

mechanic was understood to be lacking in peace of mind, preventing care from entering thought. Pirsig summarises three states of peace of mind. Physical quietness, Mental quietness, and thirdly *'Value quietness, in which one has no wandering desires at all but simply performs the acts of his life without desire'* [278]. This lineage is only possible once an individual understands the importance of an *authentic* self, then beginning a journey to find this mutual *authenticity*.

Imparting an authentic self is relevant to context, and there are many contexts with many individuals, so it can be understood there are many different paths that can be taken to arrive there. The application of a Zen approach to reality arises in several circumstances, regularly relating to *craft* (a process of creating). Paths followed for the creation of authentic reality can act as a blueprint for re-creation, none of which are ever absolute.

There are two examples that best show a tie to Zen, and both are born from the original ideas of an isolated individual(s). *Autoprogettazione* (Mari, 2002) holds echoes of Zen in its desire to increase understanding of the self. For Enzo Mari, locating the format for his will to change derived from woodworking, "in the recovery of the essentiality of the job".[A,43] The absolutism found in the discipline is inauthentic. Mari provides blueprints and measurements for a variety of different homewares and furniture items that can be made by the inexperienced individual, which enables his work to be understood with direct ties to need, use, and function. Therefore, "...when making the user becomes aware of the structural reasoning,... subsequently he improves his own ability to assess the objects." [A, 45] By providing a platform for questioning often forgotten subject matter, the individual become more individual and more authentic. Mari specifies that the design cannot be used for commercial gain, for the skill gained must be harnessed to negate the lack of authentic reality created by a consumer context. In doing so, people are

liberated from over-arching conditions through the personal cultivation of their own skill.

The work of Buckminster Fuller was born of a *'Personal Self-Discipline'*, clarified in *The Unfinished Epic of Industrialization.* (Fuller, 1962). The conditions in which Fuller nurtured his *self* are rooted in a fundamental split from ideas of individual representation. *'That every individual who wants to survive must earn a living'* is flawed, for it is rooted in *'the general economic dictum of society'.* In isolating the individual and viewing in in relation to a series of concepts, Fuller finds *'an individual's antientropic responsibility in universe'.* An isolated self with a propensity to create radical change on principle is closely linked to Zen enlightenment, in which the individual understands a final negation and remains as *real* to aid change, and Fuller gives his process with clarity.

"I sought for the tasks that needed to be done that no one else was doing or attempting to do, which if done would physically and economically advantage society and eliminate pain.

As a consequence, it was necessary for me to discipline my faculties to develop technical and scientific capabilities to invent the physical innovations and their service industry logistics. " [all 227]

The translation of this thought to the context of the time was received as either an experiment, Fuller's place as the centrepiece of the *Montreal Expo – 1967* is an example of his work as a gimmick, or too repetitive for the same ideas re-constituted perhaps lacked the freedom in experimentation of the time (Brand,1968). This reception of a radical yet considered and functional body of work leaves a question surrounding *authenticity* for craft in context. If radical thought creates authentically in only a minority of cases, then it is important to recognise the effect of the majority of craft practice

contributing to narrative. Those acting with pragmatism and a certain intent to form a direct challenge to context are aiming their work, whereas craft tailored to expectation, with narrative, only provides a greater volume of inauthentic material that covers *real* reality. As Mari states, it is often "*nothing more than a degrading of culture...doing something imitative, without properly knowing what you are doing, just to be able to say: 'I made it'...* "(A. 45)

There is a common thread that lies in attempts to answers the problems of modernity; a lack of authenticity. Rediscovering, then working for this essential ideal is the answer to the solution, although its physical mode is flexible. A better understanding of the self can provide the individual with a direction to take to find authenticity, running counter to the malaise of modernity. The subconscious projection of authenticity will craft a new mode of *real* reality, placating the visceral fear found in the current context, and most importantly provide each individual with a series of actions that remove them from a flawed system, therefore providing an answer for its erasure.

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